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that this part of the book had been much more fully developed. In its insistence upon the eternal values and their numerical distinctness from the values which are experienced in our finite life the issue with certain types of pragmatism is joined and it is not made clear just how far Realism can make its peace with the doctrine of evolution. To say that some existents evolve and no subsistents evolve is at least only to put a new problem.

JAMES H. TUFTS.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. N. S. Vol. XVII:
Papers read during the Thirty-Ninth Session, 1917–18. London:
 Williams and Norgate, 1918. Pp. iv, 655. Price 20s. net.

The new volume contains a thoroughly representative set of papers, reaching the high level of excellence we have come to associate with this Society, whose *Proceedings* are now quite indispensable to anyone wishing to keep abreast of philosophical thought in England. Furthermore—what would have been a surprising phenomenon even in times of peace—quality is maintained side by side with a uniform increase in quantity.

The papers of special interest to the student of ethics may be divided into two main groups: (1) The first is a series of papers possessing what the author of one of them calls “an unwonted theistic flavour.” Those of direct ethical interest are centered about the moral arguments for theism. In *The Theory of a Limited Deity* Dr. D’Arcy, the Bishop of Down, takes off from Mr. H. G. Wells’ *God the Invisible King* and shows how the hypothesis of a limited deity arises out of the problem of evil. But he asserts that “this problem is absolutely insoluble for finite souls” (p. 166). Naturally enough, therefore, the Bishop in seventeen more pages fails to solve it. In *Omnipotence* Dr. Schiller criticises this paper, and urges that the alternative theory of an infinite or omnipotent God is not acceptable on either logical or scientific or religious grounds. “If” writes Dr. Schiller, developing his ethical argument “the world is to contain a real moral issue, it must be *denied* that the victory of right has been assured from all eternity—if for no other reason than that, if it has been, there cannot be anything wrong with the appearances which exhibit right so often overborne by might. If these appearances are unreal and do not matter, they need not be changed; and so there can be no reason why the right should ever *appear* to triumph. On the other hand, if there is a real moral issue, the

power of God cannot be ‘omnipotent’; it can, and therefore may, need our co-operation and support” (p. 269). And he asks in conclusion if we might not “be encouraged a little by our spiritual guides to think that our world . . . may even achieve a good, without being absolutely guaranteed by a vain ‘omnipotence’”? The Rev. W. R. Matthews boldly sets aside the problem of evil and undertakes to show, in his *Moral Argument for Theism* that the very facts of morality furnish us with data affording a cumulative argument by means of which we may establish God’s existence with a high degree of probability. He makes use of the concept of development to demonstrate that a *Deus ex machina* is required to explain the emergence of moral ideals; the developing moral consciousness being, in fact, a revelation of “the purpose of the world as a whole.” But Mr. Matthews is not content to regard this as the mere hypothesis his method alone entitles him to reach, as is shown by his assertion that “the claim of the moral aspect of our experience to be considered in forming our general view of the nature of the world must be put much higher than that of mere equality with others” (p. 386). And amongst others is included, I suppose, the cognitive aspect of experience and therefore the concept of development itself. It would seem simpler to rely on revelation in its older sense.

(2) The second series of papers of direct ethical interest forms a continuation of a discussion on the philosophical foundations of politics which has been in progress in these *Proceedings* since 1914. It is well to be reminded in these days of undue reliance upon the bare forms of “political” democracy that, both before and during the war, the more intelligent of political thinkers have concerned themselves with the defects of this system as represented in the Anglo-Saxon world. For political democracy is of little value to society as a whole so long as political power is largely determined by economic power. It has been one of the merits of the Aristotelian Society discussion to bring this issue into the light of day. In *The Conception of a Unitary Social Order* Prof. H. J. W. Hetherington claims that the modern attack on the classical idealist theory of the state involves the “elimination of the whole conception of ‘obligation’ which is the clue to any rational explanation of social organization” (p. 289). The more convincing portion of the paper is the criticism of the anti-intellectualist attack on the state as the product of a mechanically organized interference with individuality. When Professor

Hetherington passes on to a defence of the sovereign state he carries less conviction. He holds, as against Mr. Cole, that the "sovereign is prior; and if we must keep the terms, the functional institutions are 'creatures' of it, rather than it of them" (p. 311). This thesis is supported by (a) an appeal to an "universal," the good of society as a whole; followed by (b) the identification of this genuine general will with the sovereign state which is its "appropriate expression." Once this piece of traditional idealist conjuring has been accomplished Professor Hetherington is able to avoid the real issue, which is whether the sovereign state *is* in any real sense the "appropriate expression" of the complex of institutions making up the web of the social world. Mr. J. W. Scott puts forward the claim, in his paper on *Realism and Politics*, that the two lines of attack on the sovereign state—namely, anti-intellectualism and the pluralism which regards the state as one among other functional institutions—have much in common. As examples Mr. Scott chooses on the one side M. Bergson's doctrine of the *élan vital* as used by syndicalists to discredit all political organization; and on the other Mr. Russell's suggestions toward social reconstruction. He believes he can show that what is common to these two modes of thought is their realism. For realism loves the given. So M. Bergson goes directly to the uncontaminated real by means of intuition; whilst Mr. Russell takes the unsophisticated reality of "vital impulse" as the basis for social reconstruction (p. 243). Whatever plausibility this view has rests on a preconceived idea of the sort of monster a realist theory of the state must be. Realism, so far as it has been applied to political theory, has concerned itself with the exact scientific description of such constructions as the sovereign state. Mr. Scott, therefore, speaks true when he calls it "a picker up of inconsidered trifles" (p. 228). But the trifles are factual trifles—a matter of some importance to a philosophy which seeks to build a state-theory for the world as it is and not for imaginary commonwealths. If then we consider Mr. Russell as an adherent of such a view, it is a mistake to group him with M. Bergson. For, speaking roughly, Mr. Russell regards intellectual constructions as retrospective descriptions of what is or what may be; and creative impulse as the basis for action. Whereas M. Bergson regards the intellect as a tool for practical activity; and intuitional impulse as the means of reaching what is. One view is thus an inversion of the other, and their supposed common basis is

clearly illusory. The remaining paper on ethics is on *Practical Dualism* by Miss E. E. C. Jones. By this is meant the doctrine that there are two supreme principles of human action: Rational Self-Love and Rational Benevolence. And it is urged that the latter implies or includes the former.

In the above, and following, notes no attempt has been made to give an adequate summary of the contents of this volume, but rather to indicate shortly the immense range of subjects treated—with occasional critical comments on points of interest to the reviewer. The remaining papers may be divided roughly into three groups.

(a) There is a series on subjects of more or less psychological interest. Prof. H. W. Carr, in the third presidential address he has given in succession, deals with *The Interaction of Mind and Body*. In *Behaviour as a Psychological Concept* Prof. A. Robinson gives an admirably clear and critical account of Behaviourism. Mr. F. C. Bartlett's interesting study, *The Development of Criticism*, arose out of an experimental investigation on problems of perceiving in which Mr. Bartlett found a tendency in his subjects to preface their descriptions of the material supplied by unsought criticisms. He contends that "the whole line of development from simple appreciation to rational and intuitional criticism, is an important exemplification of the influence of the fundamental 'effort after meaning'" (p. 100). Prof. J. A. Smith answers the question *Is There a Mathematics of Intensity?* with a negative, on the grounds that attempts at such "have plausibility only so long as analogy is mistaken for identity" (p. 134). I find it difficult to follow the course of the argument, but it seems to be claimed that because what Meinong has called "substitutive measurement" is applied to intensities it is therefore more inexact than the measurement of divisible quantities in which "units" are possible.¹ But this is false; for all measurement, intensive no less than extensive, depends ultimately on analogies between natural phenomena and the operations of some calculus. An effective reply to Professor Smith's denial is in fact supplied in this very volume in Miss D. Wrinch's short but excellent sketch of the possibility of a calculus of pleasures (*On the Summation of Pleasures*, p. 589).

¹Cf. Prof. Dawes Hicks, *British Journ. of Psychology*, Vol. VI, p. 169: "Because, however, there are not . . . units of sensation, it does not by any means follow that sensations are not measurable."

(b) There are a number of papers dealing with historical questions. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks gives an able and learned comparison between *The "Modes" of Spinoza and the "Monads" of Leibniz*; and Prof. A. E. Taylor's paper on *The Philosophy of Proclus* is an extremely interesting and encyclopedic account of the Neo-Platonists as "neither magicians nor emotional *schöne Seelen*," but as systematic, rational philosophers. Dr. F. W. Thomas writes on *Indian Ideas of Action and their Interest for Modern Thinking*; and Mr. A. A. Cock on *The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God*.

(c) The third group of papers deals with problems raised by New Realist thought. Dr. G. E. Moore, in his subtle and important paper on *The Conception of Reality*, criticises the distinction which Mr. Bradley seems, in his *Appearance and Reality*, to make between "being real" and "existing," "being a fact," and "being." Miss L. S. Stebbing's paper on *The Philosophical Importance of the Verb "To Be"* is a heroic attempt to introduce order into the whole complicated question of "being." *Space-Time* by Prof. S. Alexander is of interest in view of modern physical notions; for it is claimed that "neither Space nor Time is a reality without the other, and that instead of the two empirical realities Space and Time there is but one reality, which is Space-Time" (p. 410). Prof. J. B. Baillie's *Anthropomorphism and Truth* is a persuasive argument against "the recent revival of mediaeval realism." Though "things are quite indifferent themselves to our intellectual operations" yet, once conceptions are obtained, it is wrong "to ascribe to objects themselves the conceptions which the intellect has devised to enable man to handle the world of objects" (p. 200). But concepts are not, as is claimed, rendered objective by reference to "objects"; nor are hypotheses (even when successful) supposed to give the "nature of things." Professor Baillie seems to make no allowance for the distinction modern realists make between the world of subsistents and that of existents. Mrs. Karin Stephen's clever exposition of what Bergson means by intuition (*Thought and Intuition*, p. 38) has a bearing on the problem here raised. It is a closely reasoned attack on "knowledge about" which, whilst of use for practical purposes, is said to devitalise the act of focussed attention by which alone we obtain the raw material for organised "knowledge about." It does not seem to be sufficiently realised that whole new fields of acquaintance are often opened up by organized thought; thus,

radioactive materials presumably existed before 1900, and yet it required organized "knowledge about" to direct the focus of attention to its phenomena.

Finally, about one third of the volume is occupied with the papers read at symposia on the following questions: (1) *Are Physical, Biological, and Psychological Categories Irreducible?* by Dr. J. S. Haldane, Prof. D'Arcy W. Thompson, Dr. P. Chalmers Mitchell, and Prof. L. T. Hobhouse; and on (2) *Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?* by Prof. B. Bosanquet, Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Prof. G. F. Stout, and Lord Haldane.

A. E. HEATH.

ETHICS IN THE PERIODICALS.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, Mai-Juin, 1918. M. de Wulf gives an interesting account of *Civilisation et Philosophie aux XII^e et XIII^e Siècles*, founded on the belief that the philosophy, art, politics, and social conditions of the Middle Ages can only be properly understood if we give up the habit of interpreting it in terms of contemporary standards, and realise that they are interdependent factors in a civilisation other than our own. *L'Art et la Philosophie* is the third of the posthumous lectures of V. Delbos. He contended that philosophy, because it has intimate and indissoluble relations with human needs, offers to art imperishable material; and further, that it is itself, in a certain way, a work of art. *La Métaphysique de Josiah Royce*, by G. Marcel, is the first part of a critical study of Royce written with great care and with sympathetic insight. In *Réflexions sur la Force du Droit*, R. H. disclaims the over simple opposition between right and might and attempts a fair statement of the will to power. But to the claims that the organised militarist state is a higher development worthy, by its increase in efficiency, of a greater place in the world, it is replied that organisation—replacing individualism—is only justified if it builds on the individual as a basis. The state does not precede the nation and create it; it is only a superior will in proportion as it gains the consent of those subject to it. And on these lines, individualistic even to the extent of denying universal moral judgments, a defence of right is built up.

MIND, N. S. 108, Oct., 1918. In *The Rights and Wrongs of a Person*, W. M. Thorburn concludes his strongly worded but stimulating series of articles. (See also Nos. 103 and 107.) Man is not the apex of creation; the world was not made for him, but he for the world. Man the Image of God, forsooth! That is only a piece of Man's vainglorious impudence; a complete contradiction of all the relevant facts. There is still the same mystery about the birth of a bull-pup and the birth of a baby. And it really would be shameful; not to take a safe shot at any pothunter or trophy-hunter, black or white, in order to save one of the fast-vanishing family of giraffes. The most effective servants of Satan are the impious imbeciles, who make a dirty little deity out of every lump of animated rubbish that can be classified under the Genus *Homo* of the Family *Anthropini*. *L'Anthropologie: voilà l'ennemi!* must be the watchword of every God-fearing student of Science and Justice. Furthermore, since "Man is